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FISCAL FORESIGHT: ANALYTICS AND ECONOMETRICS
ERIC M. LEEPER, TODD B. WALKER, AND SHU-CHUN SUSAN YANG
Abstract. Fiscal foresight—the phenomenon that legislative and implementation lags en-
sure that private agents receive clear signals about the tax rates they face in the future—is
intrinsic to the tax policy process. This paper develops an analytical framework to study
the econometric implications of ﬁscal foresight. Simple theoretical examples show that fore-
sight produces equilibrium time series with a non-invertible moving average component,
which misaligns the agents’ and the econometrician’s information sets in estimated VARs.
Economically meaningful shocks to taxes, therefore, cannot be extracted from statistical
innovations in conventional ways. Econometric analyses that fail to align agents’ and the
econometrician’s information sets can produce distorted inferences about the eﬀects of tax
policies. Because non-invertibility arises as a natural outgrowth of the fact that agents’
optimal decisions discount future tax obligations, it is likely to be endemic to the study
of ﬁscal policy. In light of the implications of the analytical framework, we evaluate two
existing empirical approaches to quantifying the impacts of ﬁscal foresight. The paper also
oﬀers a formal interpretation of the narrative approach to identifying ﬁscal policy.
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1. Introduction
Fiscal policy presents researchers with a unique empirical challenge: how to identify and
quantify the impacts of foreseen “shocks” to taxes. The challenge posed by taxes is unique
because few economic phenomena provide economic agents with such clear signals about
how important margins will change in the future. Intrinsic to the process of changing taxes
are two kinds of lags: the legislative lag between when new tax law is proposed and when
it is passed and the implementation lag between when the legislation is signed into law and
when it actually takes eﬀect. Estimates of the total lag range from a couple of months to
two years or more, depending on the particular legislation being considered.
Public ﬁnance economists recognize the possibility of ﬁscal foresight and have accumu-
lated empirical evidence of its importance using a variety of econometric and event-study
techniques.1 Macroeconomists sometimes acknowledge the possibility of ﬁscal foresight in
empirical work and occasionally study it in theoretical models, but the empirics are typically
not grounded in theory. This paper is the ﬁrst analytical study of the econometric implica-
tions of ﬁscal foresight. Theory suggests that ﬁscal foresight poses a substantial challenge to
econometric analysis of ﬁscal policy.
Two lines of attack on ﬁscal foresight appear in the empirical macro literature. The ﬁrst
estimates conventional VARs, identiﬁed in a variety of creative ways to isolate “anticipated
taxes,” and then examines the impacts of ﬁscal foresight ex-post [Sims (1988), Blanchard
and Perotti (2002), Yang (2007b), Mountford and Uhlig (2008)]. A second line rejects VAR
identiﬁcation schemes ex-ante, arguing that they cannot adequately measure the impacts of
foreseen changes in ﬁscal policy, and takes a diﬀerent—narrative—approach to identiﬁca-
tion that brings fresh data to bear on the problem [Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Edelberg,
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), Ramey (2007), Romer and Romer (2007a), Mertens and
Ravn (2008)]. Ex-post and ex-ante approaches share the aim of ﬁnding instruments for news
about future tax changes.
This paper argues that ﬁscal foresight cannot be confronted ex-post. Even very creative
identiﬁcation schemes are unlikely to correctly extract the tax news in agents’ information
sets from the information embedded in conventional VARs. In addition, ex-ante approaches,
while correctly skeptical of the eﬃcacy of VAR methods for this application, tend to achieve
identiﬁcation through a variety of heroic—and often implicit—identifying assumptions. Once
those assumptions are laid bare, it is easy to be equally skeptical of both empirical approaches
to ﬁscal foresight.
1Evidence of foresight leading up to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 is documented in Auerbach and Slemrod
(1997) and Burman, Clausing, and O’Hare (1994).
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Fiscal foresight poses a formidable challenge because, as Yang (2005) shows, it generates
an equilibrium with a non-invertible VARMA representation.2 Non-invertibility, in turn,
implies that the fundamental shocks to tax policy cannot be recovered from current and
past observable data, a central assumption of conventional econometric methods. This dif-
ﬁculty was pointed out in the early rational expectations econometrics literature by Hansen
and Sargent (1980, 1991) and recently emphasized by Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez,
Sargent, and Watson (2007).3 To the extent that ﬁscal foresight is an intrinsic feature of the
tax policy process, conventional ﬁscal VARs ascribe to the econometrician an information
set that is strictly smaller than the information set on which agents base their decisions. A
smaller information set can lead the econometrician to label as “tax shocks” objects that
are linear combinations of all the exogenous disturbances at various leads and lags. This
mislabeling undermines eﬀorts to quantify how tax policy changes aﬀect the macro economy.
We present simple analytical examples of how ﬁscal foresight aﬀects equilibrium time se-
ries and use the examples to examine the nature of the problems that foresight creates for
econometric analysis. As the examples make clear, the non-invertibility that arises in the
presence of ﬁscal foresight is a natural by-product of the fact that agents’ optimal intertem-
poral decisions discount future tax obligations. Private agents discount recent news more
heavily because it informs about taxes in the more distant future. The econometrician, in
contrast, discounts in the usual way, down weighting older news relative to recent news.
Agents and the econometrician employ diﬀerent discounting patterns because the econome-
trician’s information set lags the agents’. These diﬀerences are the source of the mistaken
inferences the econometrician draws. Confronting foresight, therefore, is a necessary step
toward detecting ﬁscal eﬀects in macro time series.
To be more precise, let εt denote the vector of exogenous disturbances that the agents
observe, with ετ,t the tax element of the shock vector. At time t, the agents’ information set
is Ωt, the span of {εt, εt−1, . . .}. An econometrician who estimates a conventional VAR with
macro variables identiﬁes exogenous shocks ε∗t , with the associated tax disturbance ε
∗
τ,t. The
econometrician’s information set at t is Ω∗t , the span of {ε∗t , ε∗t−1, . . .}. In the presence of tax
foresight, Ω∗t is strictly smaller than Ωt. Analytical examples, moreover, show that typical
VAR speciﬁcations are likely to obtain measures of ε∗τ,t that are linear combinations of current
2Leeper (1989) explores ﬁscal foresight in the context of monetary-ﬁscal policy interactions.
3A closely related line of work examines the conditions under which a ﬁnite-order VAR can adequately
capture agents’ information sets when state variables are excluded from the VAR system [for example, Cooley
and Dwyer (1995), Fry and Pagan (2005), Kapetanios, Pagan, and Scott (2005), Giannone, Reichlin, and
Sala (2006), Giannone and Reichlin (2006), Chung and Leeper (2007), Dungey and Fry (2007)]. This work
argues that expanding the VAR to include important state variables can solve the invertibility problem.
Faust, Rogers, Swanson, and Wright (2003) and Faust, Swanson, and Wright (2004) do not directly address
non-invertibility, but they use high-frequency ﬁnancial data to expand the econometrician’s information set
to aid in identifying monetary policy eﬀects. Fiscal foresight is distinctive because data on the missing state
variable—anticipated future tax rates—are not easily available.
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and past realizations of all the exogenous shocks in ε. Foresight about tax changes can lead
to econometric estimates of tax disturbances that confound taxes with other sources of dis-
turbance and treat as “news” old information to which rational agents have already reacted.
Foresight can also lead to identiﬁcation of non-policy disturbances that are convolutions of
all the underlying exogenous shocks.
Misalignment of agents’ and the econometrician’s information sets has disturbing implica-
tions for the econometric analyses that macroeconomists typically conduct. Impulse response
functions and variance decompositions can be profoundly wrong. Granger-causal orderings
can be reversed. An econometrician may infer that cross-equation restrictions and present-
value relations do not hold, even when they hold when information sets are correctly aligned.
In sum, failure to address ﬁscal foresight can seriously distort many of the inferences that
macroeconomists draw from empirical work.
The analysis leads to a framework to explain why neither the ex-post nor the ex-ante
empirical approach can resolve the foresight issue when estimating tax eﬀects, despite the fact
that the approaches appear to yield plausible results.4 Diﬃculties in handling ﬁscal foresight
may explain why no consensus has emerged about whether foresight matters. Existing
empirical work concludes that an anticipated cut in taxes may have little or no eﬀect [Poterba
(1988), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Romer and Romer (2007a)], may be expansionary in
the short run [Mountford and Uhlig (2008)], or may be contractionary in the short run
[Branson, Fraga, and Johnson (1986), House and Shapiro (2006), Mertens and Ravn (2008)].
This paper focuses exclusively on foresight about taxes, but misalignment of agents’ and
the econometrician’s information sets, and the possibility of non-invertible equilibrium rep-
resentations, is a widespread problem in macroeconomics. A prominent example of non-
invertibility is Quah’s (1990) resolution of Deaton’s (1987) paradox; the resolution relies on
agents forecasting future income using strictly more information than the econometrician
does. Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, and Sargent (2005) contains several examples
of DSGE models that in some regions of the parameter space exhibit an invertibility prob-
lem. Non-invertibility is likely to present itself in several areas of research that are now
receiving attention: news about future technological improvement [Beaudry and Portier
(2006), Christiano, Ilut, Motto, and Rostagno (2007), Jaimovich and Rebelo (2008)]; fore-
sight about large government spending run ups [Ramey (2007)]; recent moves by several
inﬂation-targeting central banks—Norges Bank, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Sveriges
Riksbank—to publish paths of future policy interest rates [Holmsen, Qvigstad, and Roisland
(2007), Blattner, Catenaro, Ehrmann, Strauch, and Turunen (2008), Laseen, Linde, and
Svensson (2008)]. Any of these applications, when studied in a rational expectations model,
4The problems associated with ﬁscal foresight apply with equal force to estimated dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium models of ﬁscal policy, such as Braun (1994), McGrattan (1994), Coenen and Straub
(2004), Forni, Monforte, and Sessa (2006), or Kamps (2007).
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would lend themselves to the type of analysis that we conduct. Our paper raises a warning
ﬂag about econometric work on these topics.
Companion papers develop the econometric approach that the analytical work implies and
then execute empirical analyses using a variety of techniques to handle ﬁscal foresight.
2. Evidence of Fiscal Foresight
Plenty of reduced-form and anecdotal evidence, mostly in the form of case studies of one
or more tax episodes, suggests that private agents possess and react to expected changes
in taxes. Reactions to tax foresight are most evident when policy changes are phased in,
incorporate sunset provisions, or include a delay between enactment and eﬀective dates.
Steigerwald and Stuart (1997) develop a residual-based test statistic, which allows com-
parison of predictions errors for econometric models under diﬀerent assumptions about the
period of tax foresight. By studying investment behavior around major tax legislation that
altered corporate income tax rates, investment tax credits, or the deductions for deprecia-
tion allowances, Steigerwald and Stuart conclude that ﬁrms had 4.5-month foresight for tax
changes in 1954, 1962, and 1981, and 16.5-month foresight for the tax reform of 1986.
In contrast to Steigerwald-Stuart, Poterba’s (1988) study of consumption responses to
tax announcements associated with legislation in 1964, 1968, 1975, 1981, and 1986, ﬁnds
little evidence of anticipatory behavior. He dates expectational changes as occurring the
month the legislation passes Congress. Poterba regards his ﬁndings as “tentative” because
his event study “is likely to have relatively low power against the alternative hypothesis that
consumers gradually revise their expectations of future tax policy and adjust consumption
accordingly” [p. 416].
The possibility that ﬁscal foresight can produce a “purely anticipatory recession” was ﬁrst
put forth by Branson, Fraga, and Johnson (1986) in an exploration of President Reagan’s
tax cuts. The Economic Recovery Tax Act, enacted in March 1981, announced a three-stage
tax cut to be phased in from 1982 to 1984. Branson, Fraga, and Johnson argue that in
an open-economy IS-LM model, anticipated tax cuts can reconcile three salient features of
the U.S. macro experience of the early 1980s: an inverted and steep real yield curve, real
appreciation of the dollar, and a severe recession—all of which occurred in 1981 and 1982,
before the tax cuts were fully realized.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 oﬀered public ﬁnance economists a rich laboratory in which
to test hypotheses that economic agents may respond to news about tax changes before
the changes are eﬀective. The legislation, which was enacted in October 1986, repealed the
capital gains exclusion from ordinary income, raising the maximum capital gains tax rate
beginning in 1987 from an eﬀective rate of 20 percent to 28 percent. During the lag between
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enactment and eﬀective dates, capital gains realizations jumped from $172 billion in 1985
to $328 billion in 1986 in anticipation of the tax hike [Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2002,
Table 1, p. 3)].
Auerbach and Slemrod (1997) thoroughly review the economic eﬀects of the 1986 reform.
They also point out the jump in long-term capital gains realizations that predated the
eﬀective date of the reform [see also Burman, Clausing, and O’Hare (1994)]. Auerbach and
Slemrod argue that the 1986 Act “established once and for all that the timing of capital
gains realizations behavior can be enormously sensitive to anticipated changes in the rate of
taxation” [p. 605]. The act also reduced corporate tax rates from a maximum of 46 percent
in 1986 to a maximum of 34 percent over 1987 and 1988. Scholes, Willson, and Wolfson
(1992) ﬁnd that the corporate tax rate reduction induced ﬁrms to act in anticipation to
defer revenue recognition or accelerate expense recognition.
Figure 1 documents two instances in which anticipations of the tax code changes associated
with the Tax Reform Act of 1986 spilled over to aﬀect monetary policy behavior. At the end
of both 1985 and 1986, the daily federal funds rate spiked as traders shifted their portfolios
to get ahead of expected restrictive tax legislation. On December 31, 1985 the funds rate rose
almost 4.5 percentage points when, after the House of Representatives passed the legislation
on December 17, traders placed higher probability that tax reform would take eﬀect during
1986. As it happened, the bill was not enacted until October 22, 1986, to be eﬀective on
January 1, 1987. This is why the funds rate more than doubled on December 30, 1986, and
remained high on the last day of 1986.5 Evidently, the trading desk at the New York Fed
underestimated the extent to which money markets would react to foresight about tax policy
changes.
A well-documented example of behavior due to foresight underlies the controversy related
to estimating the taxable income elasticity with respect to the tax hike for the high-income
group that was embedded in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. Feldstein and
Feenberg (1996) examine the changes in income and tax data from 1992 to 1993 and ﬁnd
a large taxable income elasticity for the high-income group. Their ﬁnding implies that an
increase in the marginal tax rate has a strong negative eﬀect on the tax base. Goolsbee
(2000), on the other hand, ﬁnds this elasticity drops to 0.4 if the data are extended to 1995.
As the share of time-shiftable compensation (such as one-time bonuses, exercising stock
options, and so forth) rose dramatically with income from 1991 to 1992, the contrasting
estimates of a high short-run and low long-run elasticity arise because high-income taxpayers
in 1992 acted upon their foresight about anticipated higher income tax rates.
House and Shapiro (2006) use a neoclassical growth model with ﬁscal foresight to calibrate
the macroeconomic eﬀects of President Bush’s phased-in cuts in capital and labor tax rates
5Behavior in the reserves market is detailed in Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1986, 1987).
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beginning in 2001. They argue that the slow recovery from the 2001 recession, especially in
the job market, can be attributed to the law’s phasing-in provisions, which created incentives
for workers and ﬁrms to delay production. Elimination of the phase-ins in 2003, moreover,
accounted for about half of the rebound in GDP in the middle of 2003. In recent work, House
and Shapiro (2008) estimate that investment in qualiﬁed types of capital—capital with a tax
recovery period of up to 20 years—rose in anticipation of the bonus depreciation provision
of the law. Investment began to rise after the House of Representatives passed the bill in
October 2001, before President Bush signed the legislation in March 2002.
Evidence of the impacts of ﬁscal foresight extends well beyond a single piece of legislation.
Yang (2007b) compares responses to a typical tax innovation from VAR systems with and
without interest rates and prices. She ﬁnds that adding the three-month Treasury bill
rate and the GDP price deﬂator (or commodity prices) to a VAR substantially reduces
the responses of labor, investment, and output to a tax innovation. Since ﬁnancial markets
tend to be relatively sensitive to news in the economy, the result is consistent with the
interpretation that information contained in ﬁnancial variables reﬂects agents’ knowledge
of future tax policy changes. Sims (1988) ﬁnds similar results for government spending
multipliers.
Fiscal foresight may also apply to government spending: anticipated shifts in spending may
trigger changes in economic behavior before the spending shift is realized. Recent eﬀorts by
Ramey (2007) to reconcile the discrepancies in the eﬀects of government spending using
the narrative approach based on war dummies and VAR approaches lead her to conclude
FISCAL FORESIGHT: ANALYTICS AND ECONOMETRICS 8
that the VAR-based innovations are indeed anticipated.6 Since the war dates are identiﬁed
based on the timing when the media reported future defense buildups, the news reports
predate the actual rises in defense spending. Ramey ﬁnds that the war dates Granger-cause
defense spending and aggregate government spending, but not vice versa. This supports the
existence of foresight about government spending policy.
There is a line of work that is often interpreted as providing evidence that consumers
do not adjust savings in response to anticipated changes in taxes and that, therefore, ﬁscal
foresight is unlikely to be important in time series data. The work, which uses natural tax
experiments to test the permanent income hypothesis, ﬁnds that agents respond strongly to
predictable changes in tax liabilities and to current disposable income, a result that is taken
as evidence against the hypothesis.7 Because these papers focus on responses at the time of
or after the implementation of the policy change, they are silent about how behavior changes
during the foresight period. In fact, in a neoclassical growth model, where the permanent
income hypothesis holds, consumption responds both at the time that news about a future
change in capital or labor tax rates arrives and after the implementation of the tax rate
change [see Yang (2005)].
The evidence of ﬁscal foresight recounted here, although not decisive, does support the
view that some adjustment in behavior occurs before tax changes are implemented. The
evidence, however, is typically rather casual, relying on case studies, and it is often not
tightly connected to theory. We now turn to an illustrative model in which some of the
econometric implications of ﬁscal foresight can be derived explicitly.
3. Analytical Example
In this section, we introduce ﬁscal foresight into a simple economic environment so that
the econometric issues can be exposited analytically. The results and conclusions reached
below extend to more general setups, as discussed in section 4.2.
6See Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) for empirical analysis of
the dynamic impacts of war dummies.
7Shapiro and Slemrod (1995) use survey data to evaluate consumption responses to reductions in the
income tax withholding as ordered by President Bush in early 1992. Parker (1999) studies withholding
changes in Social Security taxes using sample drawn from 1980 and 1993 and Souleles (1999) studies changes
to the receipts of tax refunds based on sample drawing from 1980 to 1991. Souleles (2002) examines the
consumption eﬀect in response to withholding changes due to the pre-announced, phase-II income tax rate
cuts in the Economic Recovery Tax Act. Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006) study President Bush’s tax
rebate in 2001. In an earlier study, very much in the spirit of this line of work, Poterba and Summers
(1987) ﬁnds a failure of Ricardian equivalence, but acknowledge that their analysis is uninformative about
the eﬀects of ﬁscal foresight.
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Consider a standard growth model with log preferences, inelastic labor supply, and com-
plete depreciation of capital. A proportional tax is levied against income. The equilibrium
conditions are well known and given by
1
Ct
= αβEt(1− τt+1) 1
Ct+1
Yt+1
Kt
(1)
Ct + Kt = Yt = AtK
α
t−1 (2)
where Ct, Kt, and Yt denote time-t consumption, capital, and output, respectively, and {At}
is an exogenous technology shock. As usual, 0 < α < 1 and 0 < β < 1. The government
sets the tax rate according to a time-invariant rule and then adjusts lump-sum transfers to
satisfy the constraint, Tt = τtYt. Government spending is identically zero.
After log linearizing equations (1)–(2), the equilibrium is characterized by a second-order
diﬀerence equation in capital
Etkt+1 − (θ−1 + α)kt + αθ−1kt−1 = Et[at+1 − θ−1at] +
{
θ−1(1− θ)
(
τ
1− τ
)}
Etτˆt+1. (3)
where θ = αβ(1− τ ) is a particularly important constant in the analysis and 0 ≤ τ < 1 is
the steady state tax rate. The solution to (3) satisﬁes the well-known saddlepath property
and is given by
kt = αkt−1 + at − (1− θ)
(
τ
1− τ
) ∞∑
i=0
θiEtτˆt+i+1. (4)
Equilibrium investment depends negatively on the expected discounted present value of
future tax rates, a well-known result [Lucas (1976), Abel (1982), Judd (1985), Auerbach
(1989)]. Of course, more distant tax rates are discounted relative to more recent rates.
To model foresight, we must specify how news about taxes signals future tax rates. For
many of the points we wish to make, it suﬃces to assume that tax information ﬂows take a
particularly simple form: agents at t receive a signal that tells them exactly what tax rate
they will face in period t + q. The tax rule is τt = τ¯e
ετ,t−q , or in log-linearized form
τˆt = ετ,t−q (5)
where τˆ denotes percentage deviations of the tax rate from its steady state value.8 We
assume the technology and tax shocks are i.i.d. and the representative agent’s information
set at date t consists of variables dated t and earlier, including the shocks, {εA,t, ετ,t}. Given
the tax rule in (5), this implies that the agent at t has (in this case, perfect) knowledge of
{τˆt+q, τˆt+q−1, . . .}.
It is useful to replace the tax rates in (4) with the news about taxes and display the
equilibrium for various degrees of ﬁscal foresight.
8Jaimovich and Rebelo (2008) assume an analogous process for the arrival of news about total factor
productivity or investment-speciﬁc shocks.
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q = 0 implies:
kt = αkt−1 + εA,t (6)
q = 1 implies:
kt = αkt−1 + εA,t − (1− θ)
(
τ
1− τ
)
ετ,t (7)
q = 2 implies:
kt = αkt−1 + εA,t − (1− θ)
(
τ
1− τ
){
ετ,t−1 + θετ,t
}
(8)
q = 3 implies:
kt = αkt−1 + εA,t − (1− θ)
(
τ
1− τ
){
ετ,t−2 + θετ,t−1 + θ2ετ,t
}
(9)
If there is no foresight, q = 0, we get the usual result that i.i.d. shocks to tax rates have
no eﬀect on capital accumulation. When there is some degree of tax foresight (q > 0),
we obtain the unusual implication that even serially uncorrelated tax hikes reduce capital
accumulation.
In this model with inelastic labor supply, i.i.d. tax shocks should not aﬀect capital accu-
mulation. As expression (7) makes clear, when there is one period of foresight, tax shocks
appear to aﬀect capital contemporaneously. Moving average terms and, therefore, potential
invertibility problems appear to arise only when the foresight horizon is greater than one
period. This result is not general and stems from the assumption of ﬁxed labor. When labor
choice is elastic, even one period of foresight can produce an equilibriumwith a non-invertible
moving average component.
An interesting, though seemingly perverse, implication of (8) and (9) is that more recent
news is discounted (by θ = αβ(1 − τ ) < 1) relative to more distant news. This is because
with two-quarter foresight, ετ,t−1 aﬀects τˆt+1, while ετ,t aﬀects τˆt+2, so the news that aﬀects
tax rates farther into the future receives the heaviest discount. Tax rates are discounted in
the usual way, while tax news is discounted in reverse order. We now explore the broader
ramiﬁcations of this discounting result.
4. The Econometrics of Foresight
We now pose the following question that underlies the premise of this section: What erro-
neous conclusions might be drawn by an econometrician who ignores foresight and proceeds
with the usual vector autoregression analysis?9
9Much of the analysis that follows is studied in a more general setting by Hansen and Sargent (1991).
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4.1. Misalignment of Information Sets and Improper Discounting. With ﬁscal fore-
sight, the information set of private agents may be larger than the econometrician’s informa-
tion set. The Wold representation theorem tells us that the econometrician’s information set
from estimating a VAR will be the sigma algebra generated by current and past observable
variables. In our setup, foresight implies that agents will observe tax news before the tax
rates are realized. Information sets of private agents will not coincide with the information
generated by observable variables, which the econometrician possesses. For example, sup-
pose agents have two-quarter foresight and the econometrician estimates a VAR employing
current and past capital and technology, {kt−j , at−j}∞j=0,[
at
kt
]
=
[
0 1
−κ(L+θ)
1−αL
1
1−αL
][
ετ,t
εA,t
]
yt =M(L)t, (10)
where κ = (1− θ)(τ/(1− τ )), θ = αβ(1− τ ) and L is a lag operator (i.e., Lsxt = xt−s). If
this system is invertible in nonnegative powers of L, then t may be obtained as a square-
summable linear combination of current and past yt. This suggests that knowledge of past
and present y is equivalent to knowledge of past and present , and forecast errors generated
by the econometrician’s VAR will coincide with the agents’.10 A necessary condition for
(10) to be a Wold (invertible) representation is that the determinant of M(z) be analytic
with no zeros inside the open unit disk.11 By direct calculation, det M(z) = κ
1−αz (z + θ), so
this representation has a zero inside the unit circle (at z = −θ). Fiscal foresight implies the
information set generated by {yt,yt−1,yt−2, ...} is smaller than the information set generated
by {t, t−1, t−2, ...}.
It is useful to think about this invertibility condition for each shock process individually.
By observing the process for technology, the econometrician will be able to recover current
and past technology shocks {εA,t, εA,t−1, ...}. However, conditioning on current and past
capital will not reveal current and past tax shocks. The reason is that while the technology
process is an invertible representation, the process for capital is not. The solution for capital
with two-quarter foresight is given by
(1− αL)kt = −κ(L + θ)ετ,t
Invertibility of the stochastic process requires |θ| > 1, so that[
1− αL
1 + θ−1L
]
kt = −κθετ,t
10More speciﬁcally, the Hilbert space generated by {yt−j}∞j=0 is equivalent (in mean-square norm) to the
Hilbert space generated by {t−j}∞j=0.
11See Appendix A for further exposition.
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is a convergent sequence. Because θ = αβ(1− τ ) < 1, the process is not invertible in current
and past capital. Of course, the representation is invertible in current and future capital:[
1− αL
1 + θL−1
]
kt = −κετ,t−1
kt = (α
−1 + θ)kt+1 − θ(α−1 + θ)kt+2 + θ2(α−1 + θ)kt+3 − · · ·+ α−1κετ,t. (11)
Therefore the only way in which the econometrician can recover the true innovations seen
by agents at time t in a VAR setting is if they have knowledge of future variables.12
Foresight concerning ﬁscal policy introduces a non-invertible moving average representa-
tion into the equilibrium. This non-invertibility implies the econometrician will not be able
to condition on current and past ετ,t. In order to determine the econometrician’s information
set, we need to derive the one-step-ahead forecast errors associated with predicting yt con-
ditional only on its past values. This is achieved by ﬂipping the root of the moving average
representation from inside the unit circle to outside the unit circle via the Blaschke factor,
[(L + θ)/(1 + θL)].13 The Wold representation for system (10) is given by[
at
kt
]
=
[
0 1
−κ(L+θ)
1−αL
1
1−αL
] [
1+θL
L+θ
0
0 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[
L+θ
1+θL
0
0 1
][
ετ,t
εA,t
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
yt = M∗(L) ∗t . (12)
which yields the Wold representation for capital
(1− αL)kt = −κ(L + θ)
[
1 + θL
L + θ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[
L + θ
1 + θL
]
ετ,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
= −κ(1 + θL) ε∗τ,t
= −(1− θ)
(
τ
1− τ
){
θε∗τ,t−1 + ε
∗
τ,t
}
. (13)
Note that by observing current and past capital, the econometrician recovers current and past
ε∗τ , which are not the news that private agents observe, ετ . The econometrician’s innovations
are the statistical shocks of the VAR, which turn out to represent information that is “old
news” to the agents of the economy. To see this more clearly note that
ε∗τ,t =
[
L + θ
1 + θL
]
ετ,t = (L + θ)
∞∑
j=0
−θjετ,t−j
= θετ,t + (1− θ2)ετ,t−1 − θ(1− θ2)ετ,t−2 + θ2(1− θ2)ετ,t−3 + · · · (14)
12Instrumental variables has been suggested as one line of attack in dealing with ﬁscal foresight [Blanchard
and Perotti (2002)]. This representation demonstrates clearly the properties necessary for valid instruments
when confronting foresight. Sections 5 and 6 develop this point further.
13Lippi and Reichlin (1994, 2003) provide a nice overview of Blaschke factors and their use in deriving
fundamental representations.
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The mapping in (14) shows that what the econometrician believes to be the tax innovation
at time t, ε∗t , is actually a discounted sum of the tax news observed by the agents at date t
and earlier.
An important implication is that the econometrician who ignores foresight will discount the
innovations incorrectly. Comparing (13) with (8), according to the econometrician’s VAR,
yesterday’s innovation has less eﬀect than today’s innovation (note the terms θε∗τ,t−1 + ε
∗
τ,t
in (13)). Agents with foresight, in contrast, discount news according to ετ,t−1+ θετ,t because
yesterday’s news has a larger eﬀect on capital accumulation than today’s news. Diﬀerences
in discounting patterns applied by the econometrician and the agents lead to a variety of
econometric problems.
4.2. Generality of Non-Invertibility. It is important to check whether the non-invertibility
produced by tax foresight that we displayed above is a general implication of foresight. We
examine the robustness of non-invertibility in a real business cycle style model with capital
and labor taxes and many of the rigidities now routinely introduced into DSGE models.
Given the information ﬂows implied by a tax rule of the form
τˆZt = ρZ τˆ
Z
t−1 + ϕZ yˆt + ε
Z
τ,t−q (15)
for Z = K,L representing capital and labor tax rates and for q = 4, we have checked
Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, Sargent, and Watson’s (2007) condition for invert-
ibility of the moving-average representation in a wide variety of models calibrated to match
key moments in U.S. macro time series. Model variations include: elastic labor supply, vari-
able utilization rates for capital and labor inputs, durable and non-durable consumption,
habit formation in non-durable consumption, investment adjustment costs, and deliberation
costs for durable goods. For the calibrated parameters and some special cases of this general
model, whenever the vector of observables does not include the tax news, εK and εL, the
model produces a non-invertible moving-average representation. While a more systematic
analysis is called for, these results suggest that the invertibility problem may be robust to
model variations of the kind commonly used to match data.
Speciﬁcation (15) is a highly stylized model of the ﬂow of news about tax changes. It
treats the foresight period, q, as the sum of the legislative and implementation lags. A more
sophisticated model would allow agents to continuously update their beliefs about the entire
path of future taxes during the legislative period and then have the dispersion of future
taxes, at least over the near future, narrow sharply upon enactment. Many other variants
on information ﬂows are possible as well. Richer speciﬁcations of information ﬂows may be
important for invertibility problems, an issue that deserves further study.
4.3. Econometric Implications. By employing VAR analysis and ignoring foresight, the
econometrician has unknowingly conditioned on a smaller information set and misspeciﬁed
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Figure 2a: Response of K to Tax Shock for [at, kt]′
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Figure 2b: Response of Y to Tax Shock for [at, kt]′
α = 0.36,β = 0.99, τ = 0.25
Figure 2. Impulse Response Functions of Capital and Output to Tax Shock
the true dynamics of the equilibrium. Not surprisingly, the consequence of this misspec-
iﬁcation is that inference provided by VARs may be quite misleading. The size of the
approximation error depends upon several factors—the complexity of the tax rule (5), the
conditioning variables of the VAR, the structural parameters, the degree of foresight, and so
forth. We show below how these factors confound the analysis in the present setting.
Impulse response functions are a widely used tool for conveying how agents dynamically
respond to innovations, but response functions based upon the econometrician’s information
set {ε∗τ,t} will not capture these responses. Consider the response functions generated by
(10) and (12). Figure 2 plots the responses of capital and output assuming two-quarter
foresight (setting α = 0.36, β = 0.99, τ = 0.25). With foresight, agents know exactly when
the innovation in ﬁscal policy is going to translate into changes in the tax rate. This creates
the sharp decline in capital one quarter after the shock and in output two quarters out
(because the tax is levied on output which depends on last quarter’s capital stock). The
econometrician’s VAR, on the other hand, discounts the innovations incorrectly and gives a
very diﬀerent response to the tax shock. The biggest decline in capital will occur on impact of
the innovation suggesting that foresight does not exist. The diﬀerence between the response
functions can be quite dramatic, especially at short horizons. Note that the drop in output
for the econometrician’s VAR is nearly four times as large as the true response one quarter
after the innovation.
Figure 2 shows that the econometrician will infer that the tax shock is unanticipated. Ob-
viously, not all shocks that aﬀect ﬁscal policy will be knowable several quarters in advance.
Consider a tax rate process, τˆt = e
u
τ,t + ετ,t−q, that allows for shocks that are anticipated
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several quarters in advance (ετ) and for surprises that are unanticipated (e
u
τ ) at time t.
14
If these shocks are orthogonal at all leads and lags, then the equilibrium dynamics of (3)
will not change because i.i.d. tax shocks will not alter the dynamics of capital. The econo-
metrician, who does not account for ﬁscal foresight and proceeds with estimating (12), will
attribute all of the dynamics associated with the anticipated component of the tax rate
to the unanticipated component. This suggests that researchers interested in the dynamic
eﬀects of ﬁscal policy—whether the interest is in anticipated or unanticipated changes in
policy—must explicitly account for foresight in order to avoid spurious results.
The ﬁgure also highlights an important diﬀerence between foresight about taxes and the
work by Christiano, Ilut, Motto, and Rostagno (2007) and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2008)
on news about technology. News about total factor productivity tends to have its biggest
impact in the period when technology directly aﬀects output. News about taxes, in contrast,
has its biggest impact in the period before the tax rate is realized, although, as the ﬁgure
suggests, the econometrician will infer that the biggest impact occurs at the time the news
arrives.
The econometric problems associated with ﬁscal foresight become even more pernicious if
we make the more plausible assumption that the econometrician cannot perfectly identify
technology shocks and, therefore, cannot condition on at. It is more natural for the econome-
trician to condition on observable taxes (or some function of taxes, such as revenues), rather
than the technology process. Consider the case with two-quarter foresight and suppose the
econometrician estimates the following VAR[
τˆt
kt
]
=
[
L2 0
−κ(L+θ)
1−αL
1
1−αL
] [
ετ,t
εA,t
]
xt = H(L)t. (16)
As in the previous case, foresight creates a zero inside the unit circle (now at z = 0), implying
that the information set generated by {xt,xt−1,xt−2, ...} is smaller than the information set
generated by {t, t−1, t−2, ...}. The corresponding Wold representation for (16) is derived
by ﬂipping the zeroes outside the unit circle as in the previous example,[
τˆt
kt
]
=
[
L2 0
−k(L+θ)
1−αL
1
1−αL
]
WB(L)W˜B(L)︸ ︷︷ ︸B(L
−1)W˜ ′B(L−1)W ′
[
ετ,t
εA,t
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
xt = H∗(L) ∗t (17)
14Christiano, Ilut, Motto, and Rostagno (2007) posit a process like this for a technology shock and
interpret realizations of the ε terms as news.
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Figure 3. Impulse Response Functions of Capital to Tax and Technology Shocks
where
W =
⎡⎣ 1√1+(θκ)2 −κθ√1+(θκ)2
κθ√
1+(θκ)2
1√
1+(θκ)2
⎤⎦ , W˜ = [Δ(1 + κ2θ2) −Δκ
Δκ Δ(1 + κ2θ2)
]
,B(L) =
[
L−1 0
0 1
]
and Δ = [(1 + κ2θ2)2 + κ2]−1/2. In this case, the orthonormal W matrix must be em-
ployed to ensure the representation remains causal (i.e., preserves the assumption that the
econometrician does not observe future values of the variables).
Now the econometric problems are more severe. First, the econometrician who ignores
foresight and proceeds with VAR analysis using (17) will obtain an impulse response function
in which foresight does not appear to exist in the data. Figure 3a gives the response of capital
to a tax shock for the agent and econometrician (α = 0.36, β = 0.99, τ = 0.25). This ﬁgure
shows that the path of capital is nearly ﬂat when conditioning on the econometrician’s
information set. Because the tax shock is assumed to be i.i.d., without foresight there would
be no response of capital to a tax shock, so the econometrician is likely to infer that the
identiﬁcation of an unanticipated increase in taxes is good. While these results are meant to
be heuristic, we believe this sounds a note of caution; by completely ignoring foresight, one
may achieve a “self-fulﬁlling prophesy” and wrongly conclude that foresight is not an issue.
Second, the statistical shocks recovered by the VAR analysis are now linear combinations
of both technology and tax shocks. From (17), the statistical shocks can be written as
ε∗τ,t = a1ετ,t−1 + a2ετ,t−2 + a3εA,t−1 + a4εA,t−2, ε
∗
A,t = b1ετ,t + b2ετ,t−1 + b3εA,t + b4εA,t−1
(18)
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where the a’s, and b’s are complicated functions of α, β and τ . The econometrician will not
only misinterpret the response to a tax shock but also the response to a technology shock.
Comparing (18) with (14), one sees that the statistical shocks generated by (17) are not
convolutions of the entire history of the structural shocks but only depend upon structural
shocks dated t − 2 and earlier. This is due entirely to the simple tax rule (τˆt = ετ,t−2).
Making the more realistic assumption that tax rates adjust automatically to technology (as
a proxy for output), to reﬂect progressivity in the tax code that operates through automatic
stabilizers,
τˆt = ϕat + ετ,t−2, (19)
implies that agents no longer have perfect foresight due to the error in forecasting technology.
This additional noise in the tax rule makes the econometrician’s inference especially poor
with respect to technology. Figure 3b plots the response function for capital given the tax
rule (19) and assuming at = ρat−1 + εA,t. The parameter settings are the same as before
with ϕ = 1 and ρ = 0.01, so the technology shock is nearly i.i.d.. The econometrician would
infer a very large and persistent response of capital to a technology shock, when in fact the
true dynamics are relatively negligible. This example has a key message: foresight impinges
on the econometrician’s ability to correctly identify all shocks in the VAR.
Finally, as also emphasized by Hansen and Sargent (1991), variance decompositions in
this environment can also lead to spurious conclusions.15 Let
E(xt − E∗t−jxt)(xt − E∗t−jxt)′ =
j−1∑
k=0
H∗k Σ∗ H′∗k
denote the j-step ahead prediction error variance associated with the econometrician’s in-
formation set, where Σ∗ is the variance-covariance matrix associated with (ε∗τ,t, ε
∗
A,t)
′. Like
impulse response functions, variance decompositions are based upon conditional expecta-
tions and hence the discrepancy in the information sets implies the coeﬃcients generated by
H∗(L) will lead to a misallocation of the variance across the structural shocks. Figure 3a
suggests that the econometrician will treat the tax shock as i.i.d. and infer that none of the
variation in capital (and hence output) can be attributed to tax innovations. Consequently,
all of the variation will be attributed to the technology shock. This result would continue
to hold even if the tax shock explained nearly all of the variation in capital (for example, by
setting the variance of the technology shock, σ2A, arbitrarily small).
15This result holds even though the statistical shocks of the VAR remain uncorrelated. While the uncon-
ditional second moments of the VAR system remain the same due to the orthogonal nature of the Blaschke
and W matrices (WW ′ = W˜W˜ ′ = I and B(L)B(L−1) = I), the conditional moments will be certainly be
diﬀerent.
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4.4. Testing Economic Theory. An obvious extension of the econometric implications is
that tests of economic theory will also be misspeciﬁed. One such example pertaining to ﬁscal
policy is the testing of the government’s present-value constraint, which links the value of
government debt to the expected discounted value of future primary surpluses. A widely-
used approach to test present-value restrictions estimates a VAR with debt and surpluses
and then tests for the cross-equation restrictions that the present-value condition imposes
on the model [Campbell and Shiller (1987)]. As we have shown, ﬁscal foresight implies the
VAR obtained by the econometrician will not yield the true dynamics and hence will not
impose the correct cross-equation restrictions.
As a simple example of how foresight will lead to type I error in present-value tests, consider
an endowment economy with lump sum taxes, a constant equilibrium real interest rate, and
one-quarter foresight with respect to innovations in surpluses (receipts less expenditures
net of interest payments on the government’s debt). Taking expectations conditional on
information at time t− 1 of the government’s ﬂow budget constraint yields
E(bt|Ωt−1) = β−1bt−1 −E(st|Ωt−1), (20)
where st is the primary surplus, bt is one-period debt outstanding, and β
−1 = (1 + r) is the
constant gross rate of return between time t and t + 1. Fiscal sustainability is ensured by
a policy rule that makes future surpluses rise with debt. Two exogenous disturbances—for
revenues and spending—drive surpluses and agents have one period of foresight over both
components of the surpluses. The policy rule is
st = γbt−1 +
ε1,t−1
1− ρ1L +
ε2,t−1
1− ρ2L (21)
where γ is set to ensure that the agent’s transversality condition for debt is satisﬁed and
0 < ρ1, ρ2 < 1 determine the serial correlation properties of the driving processes. The
expectations are taken with respect to the agents’ information set, which is assumed to
be, Ωt−1 = {ε1,t−j, ε2,t−j}∞j=1. If this process holds for t = 0, 1, ...T , then imposing the
transversality condition on government debt,
lim
N→∞
βNE(bt+N |Ωt−1) = 0
implies the present-value restriction that the current value of outstanding debt equals future
discounted surpluses,
bt =
∞∑
j=1
βjE(st+j|Ωt−1). (22)
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Following Hansen, Roberds, and Sargent (1991) and Roberds (1991), the cross-equation
restrictions that satisfy (22) are given by[
st
bt
]
=
[
LA(L) LC(L)
β[L2A(L)−β2A(β)]
L−β
β[L2C(L)−β2C(β)]
L−β
][
ε1,t
ε2,t
]
yt = P(L)vt (23)
where A(L) = β
−1−γ
(1−ρ1L)(1−γL) , and C(L) =
β−1−γ
(1−ρ2L)(1−γL) . Two observations spring from (23).
First, foresight implies that (23) is not an invertible representation (due to the zero at L = 0).
Second, the cross-equation restrictions imposed on the moving-average representation are
nonlinear.
In light of the second observation, Campbell and Shiller (1987) derive the present-value
restrictions on the VAR representation instead of the moving-average representation. This
simpliﬁcation makes the present-value constraint easy to test, as it amounts to restrictions
on the coeﬃcients of the VAR. Denote the invertible representation of (23) by P∗(L) and
write the corresponding VAR of (23) as16[
st
bt
]
= A∗−10 A∗1(L)
[
st−1
bt−1
]
+A∗−10
[
ε∗1t
ε∗2t
]
=
[
a11 a12
a21 a22
][
st−1
bt−1
]
+
[
w1t
w2t
]
yt = A
∗yt−1 +wt (24)
Note that A∗(L) = P(L)∗−1, implying that the coeﬃcients of the VAR will not yield the
correct cross-equation restrictions implied by (23) when there is foresight. Campbell and
Shiller (1987) show that the restrictions on the VAR coeﬃcients implied by the present-
value constraint are given by
a11 + a21 = 0, a22 + a12 = β
−1 (25)
With foresight, however, the restrictions given by (25) will not hold even though the present-
value constraint is satisﬁed. The VAR estimates give
a11 + a21 =
ηρ1ρ2βA(β)C(β)
ρ2C(β)− ρ1A(β), a22 + a12 =
A(β)ηρ2ρ1(C(β)− A(β))
β(ρ2C(β)− ρ1A(β))
where η = (1 + [A(β)C(β)]2)−1/2. Therefore, the econometrician will incorrectly reject the
null hypothesis that the present-value constraint holds.
Sargent (1981) calls for Granger (1969)-Sims (1972) causality tests to play a key role in
helping the econometrician determine which variables properly belong in agents’ information
16Given the structure of the non-invertibility, the invertible representation is obtained as in (17).
FISCAL FORESIGHT: ANALYTICS AND ECONOMETRICS 20
sets. For example, causality tests are commonly used to justify treating variables as exoge-
nous for purposes of inference.17 Causality tests, however, are misspeciﬁed if agents have
ﬁscal foresight.18 To see this more clearly, return to the analytical model of section 3 with
one quarter of foresight and an i.i.d. tax rule. The (true) moving-average representation, on
the left, and the (econometrician’s) fundamental representation, on the right, in the variables
(τˆt, kt)
′ are given by[
τˆt
kt
]
=
[
L 0
− κ
1−αL
1
1−αL
] [
ετ,t
εA,t
]
=
[
δ −κδL
0 [δ(1− αL)]−1
][
δ(ετ,t−1 + κεA,t−1)
δ(−ετ,t + κεA,t)
]
xt = D(L)t =D∗(L)∗t . (26)
where δ = (1 + κ2)−1/2. Note that the zero appearing in the true MA will appear in the
opposite oﬀ-diagonal in the econometrician’s representation. By theorem 1 of Sims (1972),
the econometrician’s representation implies that τˆ fails to Granger-cause k; in fact, τˆ lies
in a proper subspace of k, and hence k fails to Granger-cause τˆ . By ignoring foresight, the
econometrician eﬀectively reverses the Granger-causal ordering of the true dynamics.
4.5. Practical Implications. The nature of the econometric problem is such that impor-
tant aspects of empirical research regarding ﬁscal policy can be misinformed. One such
example is the short-run forecasts of macroeconomic aggregates in response to legislative
changes. This is an important empirical issue if, as is often the case, the tax change is
designed to operate at business cycle frequencies. Econometricians who do not adequately
handle foresight may get the forecast of aggregates wrong, especially in the short run. Figure
2 demonstrates that with two-quarter foresight most of the discrepancy between the impulse
response functions of the agent and econometrician dissipates only after six quarters. This is
due to the moving-average component of the equilibrium and the degree of foresight. As the
degree of foresight increases, this discrepancy will become more prominent at longer hori-
zons and the econometrician’s short-run forecast will deviate further from the truth. Hence,
it is essential that foresight be confronted when examining the response of macroeconomic
aggregates to ﬁscal stimulus.
Short-run dynamics are also crucial for forecasting the revenue consequences of proposed
legislation. Pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) budget rules, which were in eﬀect in the U.S. Congress
for ﬁscal years 1991-2002, then allowed to lapse before being reestablished for one year in
2007 and then abandoned in favor to Alternative Minimum Tax relief, require that tax cuts
be oﬀset by spending reductions of other tax increases. This system places great reliance
on forecasting tax revenues over short horizons—the horizons over which failing to account
17Romer and Romer (2007b) argue that the failure of output to Granger-cause their measure of tax news
reinforces their speciﬁcation of news as exogenous in an output regression.
18Leeper (1990) shows that ﬁscal foresight can imply that money growth Granger-causes deﬁcits in an
equilibrium in which deﬁcits are systematically monetized.
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for ﬁscal foresight can have dramatic consequences. Revenue forecasts play a central role
in determining U.S. state government budgets because most states are required to balance
budgets every ﬁscal year or over a two-year budget cycle. Spending decisions then rely
heavily on accurate forecasts of revenues.
5. Assessing the Ex-Post Approach
In this section and the next, we evaluate existing empirical eﬀorts to quantify the impacts
of ﬁscal foresight in light of the theoretical framework developed above. We examine both
ex-post approaches, which estimate conventional ﬁscal VARs and attempt to align the agents’
and the econometrician’s information sets through clever identiﬁcation schemes, and ex-ante
approaches, which reject conventional VARs in favor of narrative evidence of ﬁscal news.
Although superﬁcially very diﬀerent in the way they tackle ﬁscal foresight, the ex-post and
ex-ante approaches can be understood as sharing a common technique: avoid estimating
the non-invertible moving average part of macroeconomic time series by obtaining “data”
on the exogenous component of anticipated tax changes. This data augmentation can be
interpreted as adding information to the standard VAR through instrumental variables. The
ex-post approach achieves this “internally” by imposing identiﬁcation schemes that aim to
isolate the exogenous component of anticipated tax changes, while the ex-ante approach
achieves this “externally” by bringing into the analysis forecasts generated by other models.
As section 4 shows, ﬁscal foresight implies the equilibrium moving-average representa-
tion will be non-invertible, and the VAR process will not capture the true dynamics of the
economy. Suppose the equilibrium moving-average representation is given by
xt =
∞∑
j=0
Hjt−j = H(L)t
where t is an (n×1) vector of white noise and
∑∞
j=0 traceHjHj <∞. If the representation
is invertible in non-negative powers of L, then
A(L)xt = (A0 − A1L − A2L2 − · · · )xt = t
where A(L) = H(L)−1. The true equilibrium dynamics may be captured by estimating
xt = A
−1
0 [A1xt−1 + A2xt−2 + · · ·+ t] (27)
where the A0 matrix is characterized to identify the structural shocks via recursive ordering
[Sims (1980)], short-run restrictions [Bernanke (1986), Sims (1986)], long-run restrictions
[Blanchard and Quah (1989)], a combination of short and long-run restrictions [Gali (1999)],
or sign restrictions [Faust (1998), Canova (2000), Uhlig (2005)].
With ﬁscal foresight, the representation is non-invertible and the invertibleWold represen-
tation obtained by the econometrician will not yield the true dynamics. Writing the invertible
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representation as xt = H∗(L)∗t , the econometrician seeks to identify the parameters in
xt = A
∗−1
0 [A
∗
1xt−1 + A
∗
2xt−2 + · · ·+ ∗t ]
where A∗(L) = H∗(L)−1, not the parameters in (27).
We now examine two prominent identiﬁcation strategies that have acknowledged foresight
in the ﬁscal VAR literature—Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Mountford and Uhlig (2008).
We document the conditions under which these identiﬁcation schemes will correctly align
the information sets and discuss the assumptions that both approaches impose.
Lags in legislative responses to economic shocks are critical to the identiﬁcation strategies
in both Blanchard-Perotti and Mountford-Uhlig. Blanchard-Perotti identify two types of
ﬁscal lags: legislative lags and implementation lags. Legislative lags are the time between
the arrival of an economic shock and the response of ﬁscal policy; implementation lags are the
delay between the policy decision and actual implementation of the tax change. Together,
the two types of lags lead to ﬁscal foresight.
Blanchard-Perotti rely heavily on legislative lags to achieve identiﬁcation. They construct
a quarterly VAR in output, xt, government revenues net of transfers, tt, and government
spending, gt, and write the reduced-form residuals as
tt = a1xt + a2e
g
t + e
t
t
gt = b1xt + b2e
t
t + e
g
t
xt = c1tt + c2gt + e
x
t ,
where ett, e
t
g, and e
x
t denote the uncorrelated structural shocks. Blanchard-Perotti achieve
identiﬁcation by arguing that legislative lags ensure that there can be no within-quarter
adjustment of ﬁscal policy to unexpected changes in GDP, other than “automatic eﬀects
of activity on taxes and spending under existing ﬁscal policy rules.” Automatic eﬀects op-
erate through parameters a1 and b1, which are elasticities of tax revenues and government
purchases with respect to output.19
Blanchard-Perotti themselves note that this timing assumption becomes tenuous if agents
have long periods of foresight. With ﬁscal foresight, it is likely that the reduced-form residuals
for tax revenues and government expenditures will respond to past innovations in output.
More speciﬁcally, a11xt−1 and b11xt−1 would be added to the above equations. Now the
identiﬁcation requirements become more stringent. For example, if there is one quarter of
foresight, the Blanchard-Perotti identiﬁcation strategy requires no discretionary response of
ﬁscal policy to output realizations both this quarter and last quarter. As the total period
of foresight increases, this assumption becomes increasingly more untenable. Yang (2007a)
19Blanchard-Perotti then show that once a1 and b1 are estimated, tt − a1xt and gt − b1xt can be used as
instruments in estimating c1 and c2. The ﬁnal two variables are set according to either a2 = 0 and b2 = 0 or
vice versa to achieve identiﬁcation of the structural shocks by triangularizing the ﬁscal sector.
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ﬁnds that the average time elapsed between a proposal announcement by a president and
enactment for major postwar U.S. income tax legislation is about seven months. Mertens
and Ravn (2008) report that the median implementation lag is six quarters. If we add these
estimates to obtain a measure of total foresight length, we have to impose the unacceptable
identifying assumption that ﬁscal authorities cannot respond to economic conditions for two
years or more.
Once this stringent assumption is placed on the model, Blanchard-Perotti then argue that
the identiﬁed structural shocks of the VAR can be used as instruments for the future tax rates
that enter the agent’s information set. To understand why this may not be the case, return
to the model of sections 3 and 4.1 with one quarter of foresight and an i.i.d. tax rule. The
(true) moving-average representation and the (econometrician’s) fundamental representation
are given by (26). The VAR representation is found by inverting D∗(L):[
δ−1 δ(Lκ(1− αL))
0 δ(1− αL)
][
τˆt
kt
]
=
[
ε∗τ,t
ε∗A,t
]
D∗(L)−1xt = ∗t
The fundamental representation obtained by the econometrician implies there is no response
of capital to the tax shock, which is the correct outcome in the no-foresight equilibrium [see
equation (6) when q = 0]. Writing out the VAR representation yields
kt = αkt−1 + ηkt , (28)
τˆt = −κδ2kt−1 + καδ2kt−2 + ητt . (29)
where ηkt = δ
−1ε∗A,t and η
τ
t = δε
∗
τ,t
Blanchard-Perotti point out that (28) and (29) are misspeciﬁed if foresight is taken seri-
ously. They augment the right-hand side of (28) with Etτˆt+1 to align the dynamics associated
with the agent’s information set (i.e., capital today should respond to taxes tomorrow with
one-quarter foresight). They then argue that the tax shock recovered from (29), ητt , pushed
forward one period, can be used as an instrument for Etτˆt+1. Even assuming that Blanchard-
Perotti’s strong identifying assumption holds, the approach still identiﬁes ητt+1 = δε
∗
τ,t+1 as
the true tax shock. This is because Blanchard-Perotti begin with a VAR representation
and attempt to attack the problem ex-post. But even with one-quarter foresight, the true
dynamics do not admit a VAR representation. From (26), ε∗τ,t+1 = δετ,t + κεA,t. Using the
tax rule with one period of foresight, τˆt+1 = ετ,t, the instrument is
ητt+1 = δ
2Etτˆt+1 + δκεA,t (30)
Evidently, ητt+1 is not a strong instrument as it is only partially correlated with ετ,t; indeed,
shocks to technology are likely to dominate ﬂuctuations in the instrument. The dynamics
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estimated using the Blanchard-Perotti strategy are then
kt = αkt−1 + c ητt+1 + ξ
k
t (31)
and the tax rule in (29), where the coeﬃcient c in (31) is a function of the estimates from
the instrumental variables regression and ξkt is a statistical shock that does not correspond
to the true innovation in capital. Estimates of the impact of tax foresight, as summarized by
c, will reﬂect anticipated tax rates, but are quite likely to be badly polluted by the inﬂuence
of current technology shocks.
Moving beyond the theoretical model in this paper, it is not clear to what extent the
Blanchard-Perotti approach alleviates the econometric issues associated with ﬁscal foresight.
It is clear that the VAR fails to capture the true dynamics: both the tax rule and the evo-
lution of capital are misspeciﬁed. The upshot is that by estimating a VAR ﬁrst without
acknowledging foresight and then attempting to deal with foresight ex-post, the Blanchard-
Perotti methodology is not able to align the information sets exactly. Given these concerns
about the Blanchard-Perotti identiﬁcation strategy, it is not surprising that they ﬁnd antic-
ipated tax changes have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on output and the majority of their results are
estimated under the assumption of unanticipated tax policy changes.
Mountford and Uhlig (2008) propose a diﬀerent solution, which combines the sign restric-
tion method with zero restrictions to identify a VAR. Similar to Blanchard-Perotti, they
argue that anticipated ﬁscal policy changes can be identiﬁed by imposing zero restrictions
on the responses of ﬁscal variables over the period of ﬁscal foresight, reﬂecting the idea
that the isolated policy shock is news about a change in future, but not present, policy
variables. Mountford-Uhlig take the ambitious approach of identifying multiple exogenous
disturbances: a government revenue shock, a government spending shock, a “business cycle”
shock, and a monetary policy shock.
To assess the identiﬁcation scheme, we consider two aspects of the scheme. First, ﬁscal
foresight does not imply a zero response of all ﬁscal variables over the foresight period. The
various ﬁscal rules considered in the previous section suggest that this is an exceptional
situation. In the special case where the tax rate is exogenous and follows the simple rule
τˆt = e
u
τ,t + ετ,t−q (32)
when news arrives in period t, the tax rate does not change until period t + q. Mountford-
Uhlig’s zero restriction, if it were applied to the tax rate, would work in this case.
But Mountford-Uhlig impose the zero restriction on tax revenues. They ﬁnd that higher
anticipated revenues reduce output—and, therefore, the tax base—over the period of fore-
sight. Lower output, coupled with the restriction that revenues are ﬁxed, delivers the ec-
centric implication that a particular sequence of unanticipated tax-rate increases, {euτ,t}, is
imposed to identify an anticipated tax hike. Considering that in most countries automatic
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stabilizers in the tax code would lower rates when output falls, it is diﬃcult to believe that
the identiﬁcation scheme has isolated the eﬀects of ﬁscal foresight.
Second, it is not clear that the sign restriction methodology will be able to correctly
identify non-ﬁscal shocks. Mountford and Uhlig claim to identify a business cycle shock
and a monetary policy shock, but when a non-invertibility exists, these shocks are typically
complicated convolutions of all shocks entering the agent’s information set. Fiscal foresight
is a pervasive problem and forcing the impulse response function of ﬁscal variables to react
in a certain way does not impose enough structure on the system to correctly identify the
other shocks [see ﬁgure 3].
6. Assessing the Ex-Ante Approach
We share the view of the ex-ante approach that, in the presence of ﬁscal foresight, conven-
tional ﬁscal VARs misalign the information sets of economic agents and the econometrician.
In the context of the model in section 3, conventional VARs estimate systems in current
and past values of capital (or output) and revenues. Fiscal foresight implies that those
systems are not invertible and do not adequately capture the ﬁscal news to which agents
respond. When tax rates are exogenous, as in the simple example, information sets are
correctly aligned by including future tax rates in the VAR. This results in a VAR system
in {kt, τt+q} and now the fundamental representation is invertible. The ex-ante approach
essentially applies this principle by seeking instruments for expected future tax obligations.
The discussion in section 4 and expression (11) make this interpretation more precise.
Although non-invertibility of the moving average representation implies there is no autore-
gressive representation in which the true ﬁscal news is a function of current and past en-
dogenous variables, there is an autoregressive representation in the ﬁscal news and future
endogenous variables. The ex-ante approach uses forecasts of revenue changes associated
with tax legislation to instrument for the information agents possess about future taxes. To
infer the eﬀects of anticipated taxes on output, the ex-ante approach regresses output against
forecasted revenue changes, among other variables, and interprets the estimated coeﬃcients
causally. To assess the ex-ante approach, we examine the quality of instruments employed.
Of course, tax rates are not exogenous. They are the outgrowth of a complex set of eco-
nomic and political decisions. Recognizing the intrinsic endogeneity of tax policy decisions,
Romer and Romer (2007a,b) use a narrative method to compile data series that decompose
the forecasted revenue consequences of federal tax changes into “endogenous” and “exoge-
nous” components. Mertens and Ravn (2008) use the Romers’ compiled data series. They
generalize the Romers’ empirical work and lay out an intricate DSGE model to interpret
their estimates of the impacts of anticipated and unanticipated changes in taxes. Whereas
the Romers ﬁnd only weak evidence that private agents react to anticipated tax changes,
FISCAL FORESIGHT: ANALYTICS AND ECONOMETRICS 26
Mertens and Ravn obtain provocative and striking results reminiscient of Branson, Fraga,
and Johnson’s (1986) argument about the Reagan tax cuts: anticipated tax cuts induce sharp
economic slowdowns during the period of ﬁscal foresight, and may even produce recessions.
In this section we use a standard real business cycle model with proportional capital and
labor tax rates to simulate equilibrium data, including forecasted revenue changes induced
by anticipated and unanticipated tax disturbances. We then run regressions using simulated
data and compare the estimated eﬀects of foreseen changes in tax rates to the true eﬀects of
ﬁscal foresight. Because the simulated data and revenue forecasts are generated by a single
coherent model, if the ex-ante approach is eﬃcacious, the regressions should recover the true
eﬀects almost exactly.
Before we can proceed with this test of the ex-ante method, we ﬁrst must embed the
narrative identiﬁcation scheme in a formal theoretical model.
6.1. Formalizing the Narrative Identiﬁcation. The Romers distinguish between “en-
dogenous” changes in taxes—ones induced by short-run countercyclical concerns and those
undertaken because government spending was changing—and “exogenous” changes in taxes—
those that are responses to the state of government debt or to concerns about long-run eco-
nomic growth. To avoid confusion with other deﬁnitions, we shall refer to these as “RR
endogenous” and “RR exogenous” components of tax policy behavior.
We specify a tax rule that includes the various motivations for tax changes that the
Romers consider and embeds both anticipated and unanticipated shocks to taxes. Alternative
parametric speciﬁcations of policy coincide with diﬀerent formalizations of the narrative
identiﬁcation scheme. Our message is that the performance of the ex-ante approach hinges
critically on the precise formalization attributed to the narrative identiﬁcation.
To reﬂect the distinction the Romers draw between “endogenous” countercyclical concerns
and “exogenous” long-run concerns, it is convenient to decompose output into business
cycle, yCt , and trend, y
T
t , components. A rule for tax rates that embeds this multiplicity of
motivations for tax changes is given by
τt = ρ(L)τt−1 +
P∑
j=−P
μCj Ety
C
t+j +
M∑
j=−M
βjEtgt+j︸ ︷︷ ︸
“RR endogenous”
+
P∑
j=−P
μTj Ety
T
t+j +
N∑
j=−N
γjEts
B
t+j−1 + ετ,t−q + e
u
τ,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
“RR exogenous”
(33)
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The ﬁscal authority’s choice of the current tax rate is permitted to respond systematically
to current, past, and expected ﬂuctuations in output at both business cycle and trend fre-
quencies and to current, past, and expected changes in government spending (gt+j) and
government indebtedness as measured by the debt-to-output ratio (sBt+j−1). The rule also
embeds an unanticipated shock, euτ,t, and “news” about the tax rate that arrived q periods in
the past, ετ,t−q. Both of these shocks are assumed to be unrelated to economic conditions.20
To study the Romers’ identiﬁcation, we simplify (33) by restricting the “RR endogenous”
component and the feedback from trend output movements in the “RR exogenous” com-
ponent. We also specialize the timing of the response to the state of government debt to
coincide with the period of foresight, q, and allow only one lag of the tax rate to enter,
ρ(L) = ρ. This simpliﬁes (33), written in terms of its anticipated and unanticipated parts,
to
τt = ρτt−1 + μCyt + ξt−q + euτ,t (34)
where
ξt−q = μT yt−q−1 + γsBt−q−1 + ετ,t−q (35)
is the ﬁscal foresight, which stems from both systematic responses of taxes to past economic
and ﬁscal conditions and exogenous news about tax legislation. By simplifying the tax rule
to restrict the sources of feedback from the economy to expected future tax rates, we are
likely to bias our results in favor of the ex-ante narrative approach.
It might seem like a stretch to model the response of tax policy to concerns about long-run
economic growth as we do in the deﬁnition of ξt−q . But several large tax bills that Romer
and Romer (2007b) label as long-run, “exogenous” tax changes could easily be categorized
as “endogenous” responses to short-term economic conditions. Stein (1996) documents that
President Kennedy was prompted to change his position on a tax cut by the stalled recovery
in 1962 and 1963 from the 1960-1961 recession.21 The Economic Recovery Act of 1981
signed by President Reagan is widely regarded as driven by philosophical considerations.
But the supply-side promise to stimulate growth without triggering inﬂation, is arguably an
endogenous reaction to the stagﬂation of the 1970s and early 1980s. The Romers classify
two recent tax cut bills signed by President Bush—part of the Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 and the Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2003—as
long-run “exogenous” events. The Economic Report of the President (2002, p. 44) argues,
“The President laid a strong foundation for growth in 2001 with the Economic Growth
20Although in their papers the Romers do not explicitly interpret tax legislation as containing shock
components, in private communication David Romer conﬁrmed that this interpretation is not inconsistent
with their views.
21The unemployment rate fell from 6.7 percent in October, 1961 to 5.5 percent in March, 1962 and then
leveled oﬀ for the remainder of 1962. Output growth was slower than in the previous year. Stein (1996) writes
that the proposal to cut taxes “was a delayed response to a chronic condition after hopes of a spontaneous
recovery were dimmed” [p. 408].
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and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act. This package provides a powerful stimulus for future
growth....” But the tax cut bills enacted in 2001, 2002, and 2003 were also clearly linked to
the recession in 2001 and its subsequent “jobless” recovery. Congressional Quarterly Press
(2006) documents that in the case of the 2003 tax cut, President “Bush continued to insist
that tax cuts were the best way to deal with both the budget deﬁcit and the slow pace of
job creation” [p. 42]. Evidently there is no sharp distinction between tax cuts motivated by
countercyclical considerations and those driven by a desire to boost economic growth in the
long run.
We have speciﬁed a rule for future tax rates, but the Romers and Mertens and Ravn employ
forecasts of tax revenues. We simulate the model to generate data and model-generated
forecasts of revenue changes due to both the unanticipated, euτ,t, and anticipated, ετ,t−q,
exogenous disturbances to capital and labor tax rates. Although the Romers estimate single-
equation regressions, we reproduce the slightly more general estimated VARs that Mertens
and Ravn use to report the dynamic impacts of the two kinds of tax shock. Speciﬁcally, we
estimate
Xt = A + CXt−1 +
24∑
i=0
DiT
u
t−i +
24∑
i=0
FiT
a
t−i +
6∑
i=1
GiT
a
t+i + ut, (36)
where Xt is a data vector that includes output, consumption, investment, and hours worked,
Xt = [lnyt, ln ct, ln it, ln lt]
′
. T ut is revenue changes divided by output due to the unanticipated
tax shock and T at+i is the out-of-sample forecast of revenue changes for anticipated tax policy
divided by output.22 Forecasts are conditional on information at t, for each date in the
simulated data. Since the DSGE model we use to generate data has separate exogenous
shocks for capital and labor tax rates, estimation of (36) is done separately for the two
taxes; therefore, to estimate the eﬀects of an anticipated capital tax cut, T ut and T
a
t in (36)
are associated with capital tax changes, and vice versa for labor taxes.23 Details of the
neoclassical growth model and the forecast procedure appear in Appendix B.
Romer and Romer and Mertens and Ravn share the critical maintained assumption that
forecasted revenue changes are the exogenous news about taxes. This assumption explains
why the system in (36) does not include an equation that describes the evolution of revenues
or government debt over time. Implicitly in Romer and Romer and explicitly in Mertens
22The Romers’ data set scales revenues by actual future output, which treats a function of future shock
realizations as a regressor in (36). We follow their procedure in the simulations.
23The Romers and Mertens and Ravn do not distinguish between capital and labor tax changes in their
empirical work. Sorting revenue forecasts into those due to capital and labor tax policy changes is a diﬃcult
task, as a single provision in a tax bill often aﬀects both capital and labor income taxes simultaneously. For
example, an across-the-board individual income tax rate reduction would change both types of taxes. In
addition, Yang (2005) shows that anticipated capital and labor taxes can have very diﬀerent eﬀects and that
assuming a single tax rate on both sources of income can mask the impacts of ﬁscal foresight.
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and Ravn’s theoretical model, lump-sum transfers are assumed to adjust to keep the govern-
ment solvent. But this Ricardian assumption conﬂicts with the way that “RR exogenous”
changes in taxes are constructed: as the rule in (33) makes clear, that constructed measure
includes legislative actions that are a response to budget deﬁcits or the state of government
indebtedness.
6.2. Simulation Results. Revenue forecasts provide an important input to ﬁscal decisions
by policy makers at both the federal and the state levels. Large ﬂuctuations in tax bases
make revenues notoriously diﬃcult to forecast accurately. One way to mimic the diﬃculties
inherent in forecasting revenues is to add measurement error that is unrelated to economic
fundamentals. An alternative, more economically grounded method, is simply to build into
the theory multiple sources of uncertainty. In addition to unanticipated and anticipated
shocks to capital and labor tax rates, the DSGE model used to simulate data includes
several other sources of random variation—shocks to technology, preferences over leisure,
government spending, and government transfers. Multiple sources of uncertainty imply that
forecasted tax rates, Etτt+q, are a function of many diﬀerent structural disturbances whose
eﬀects on taxes operate through the endogenous variables.
Figures 4-7 depict the paths of consumption and output in response to six-period foresight
about cuts in labor and capital tax rates. Shocks to tax rates are assumed to be correlated,
though not perfectly, as they are in data. Panels (a)-(d) reﬂect alternative parametric
formalizations of the narrative identiﬁcation. These impulse response functions are derived
from estimates of (36) using 1000 sample paths generated by the growth model.24 Heavy
solid lines are the true theoretical impacts; thin solid lines are the means of the estimated
impacts; dashed lines are 68 percent probability bands for the estimated responses.
Panel (a) is the best-case scenario for the narrative approach. It shuts down all responses
of tax rates to economic conditions and has lump-sum transfers adjust to stabilize debt.
The policy rule becomes τt = ρτt−1 + ετ,t−q + euτ,t; transfers evolve according to Tt = γT s
B
t−1,
with γT > 0. Across all four ﬁgures, estimates of (36) do a very good job of recovering the
theoretically correct responses.25
Once tax rates respond to debt, estimates based on the VAR in (36) can go badly astray
over both the period of foresight and longer horizons. Panels (b)-(d) each impose that
labor and capital tax rates adjust to stabilize debt (γτ > 0); they diﬀer in the degree to
which tax policy choices react to output and in the relative variability of anticipated and
unanticipated exogenous disturbances to taxes. Panel (b) comes from a model that allows for
24See Appendix B.4 for details on how the impulse response functions are computed.
25Discrepancies between the thin and the thick solid lines arise from the fact that the Romers and Mertens
and Ravn scale forecasted revenue changes by actual future GDP, a procedure that we mimic, whereas the
true theoretical responses do not include this scaling.
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Figure 4. Responses of Consumption to 6-Period Foresight of Labor Taxes.
Panel (a) μC = 0, μT = 0, γT = −.1, σK = .025, σL = .02
Panel (b) μC = 1, μT = 0, γτ = .05, σK = .025, σL = .02
Panel (c) μC = 1, μT = .5, γτ = .05, σK = .025, σL = .02
Panel (d) μC = 1, μT = .5, γτ = .05, σKa = .0375, σKu = .0125, σLa = .03, σLu = .01
automatic stabilizers in the tax code (μC > 0); panel (c) includes both automatic stabilizers
and ﬁscal foresight that includes a systematic response to past output (μT > 0); panel (d)
includes both of these components but raises the variance of anticipated tax shocks relative to
unanticipated tax shocks, reﬂecting the fact that because most tax changes are implemented
with a lag, anticipated changes are more prevalent and more important. Modeling “RR
exogenous” tax changes as including a systematic response of tax rates—as opposed to
lump-sum transfers—to the state of government debt is fully consistent with the Romer’s
narrative, so panels (b)-(d) of the ﬁgures provide more appropriate assessments of the ex-ante
approach.
The ex-ante approach may perform quite well over the period of foresight, as it does in
estimating the response of consumption to foresight about a capital tax rate cut in ﬁgure 5
(see also ﬁgure 6). But it can also perform very poorly. Figure 4 shows that an anticipated cut
in labor taxes creates a boom in consumption in the foresight period, while estimates of (36)
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Figure 5. Responses of Consumption to 6-Period Foresight of Capital Taxes.
Panel (a) μC = 0, μT = 0, γT = −.1, σK = .025, σL = .02
Panel (b) μC = 1, μT = 0, γτ = .05, σK = .025, σL = .02
Panel (c) μC = 1, μT = .5, γτ = .05, σK = .025, σL = .02
Panel (d) μC = 1, μT = .5, γτ = .05, σKa = .0375, σKu = .0125, σLa = .03, σLu = .01
ﬁnd that a substantial recession is quite likely. A less pronounced slump in consumption
is estimated for the response of output to a foreseen capital tax cut, when the correct
theoretical response is a mild expansion [ﬁgure 7]. The inference that a recession occurs
before an anticipated cut in taxes coincides closely with Merten and Ravn’s results from
estimating (36) based on the Romer’s data on changes in tax liabilities.
Diﬃculties with the ex-ante approach are not limited to inferences about the eﬀects of
foresight over the short run. Figure 4 shows that over horizons of ﬁve or more years, it is
very unlikely that estimates of (36), which die out rather quickly, will recover the medium-
run decline in consumption following a reduction in labor tax rates. The source of the
mispredictions is that the VAR system in (36) treats the changes in revenues forecasts, the
T at+i terms, as exogenous “shocks” that are not systematically related to the state of the
economy. This treatment fails to provide agents with the structural information that debt-
ﬁnanced tax cuts will ultimately bring forth higher tax rates still farther in the future. In
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Figure 6. Responses of Output to 6-Period Foresight of Labor Taxes.
Panel (a) μC = 0, μT = 0, γT = −.1, σK = .025, σL = .02
Panel (b) μC = 1, μT = 0, γτ = .05, σK = .025, σL = .02
Panel (c) μC = 1, μT = .5, γτ = .05, σK = .025, σL = .02
Panel (d) μC = 1, μT = .5, γτ = .05, σKa = .0375, σKu = .0125, σLa = .03, σLu = .01
other words, given how the revenue forecasts are constructed, treating them as evolving
autonomously amounts to misspecifying the tax rule. Panels (b)-(d) of ﬁgure 4 make clear
that misspeciﬁcation of the tax rule is the source of the medium-run mispredictions: when
lump-sum transfers adjust to stabilize debt, as in panel (a), the estimated system in (36)
nails the responses at longer horizons.
Our simulation exercise dramatically understates the uncertainty inherent in revenue fore-
casts because our model forecaster knows the true structure of the economy. If the ex-ante
approach cannot consistently work in our idealized laboratory, the noise associated with ac-
tual revenue forecasts is likely to hinder severely the method’s ability to recover anticipated
tax eﬀects.
This assessment of the ex-ante approach employs a barebones real business cycle model and
a relatively crude speciﬁcation of tax policy behavior. A model with many more parameters
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Figure 7. Responses of Output to 6-Period Foresight of Capital Taxes.
Panel (a) μC = 0, μT = 0, γT = −.1, σK = .025, σL = .02
Panel (b) μC = 1, μT = 0, γτ = .05, σK = .025, σL = .02
Panel (c) μC = 1, μT = .5, γτ = .05, σK = .025, σL = .02
Panel (d) μC = 1, μT = .5, γτ = .05, σKa = .0375, σKu = .0125, σLa = .03, σLu = .01
and internal propagation mechanisms or a more sophisticated characterization of policy can
generate far more exotic dynamics. But greater complexity does not alter the basic message:
success of the ex-ante approach hinges on how the narrative method of identifying tax news
is formalized. Even simple theory can produce a wide range of conclusions about the eﬃcacy
of the approach. Two factors emerge as critical to the success of the ex-ante approach:
the degree to which forecasted revenue changes reﬂect exogenous changes in taxes and the
relative volatility of the random components of tax decisions.
7. Concluding Remarks
We have explicitly shown how ﬁscal foresight introduces econometric diﬃculties that com-
plicate the interpretation of VARs. The crux of the issue is that foresight introduces non-
invertible moving average representations into the linear equilibrium process. Non-invertible
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moving average representations imply that the mapping between the true tax news that
agents observe and the “tax shocks” that the econometrician identiﬁes can be vastly dif-
ferent. The models illustrate the kinds of mistaken inferences an econometrician is likely
to draw. Many of the econometric techniques in macroeconomists’ toolboxes—impulse re-
sponse functions, variance decompositions, Granger-causality tests, tests of cross-equation
restrictions—can be badly distorted by empirical methods that do not adequately estimate
the non-invertible moving average components of equilibrium time series.
Existing time series work on ﬁscal foresight—what we have termed the ex-post and ex-ante
approaches—seeks instrumental variables that contain the agents’ information about future
tax changes. Because foresight implies that conventional VARs recover “tax shocks” that are
convolutions of all the exogenous disturbances, the VAR innovations employed in the ex-post
analyses are likely to be poor instruments. We have shown that the success of the ex-ante
approach depends critically on how the narrative identiﬁcation scheme is formalized. We
modeled a class of parametric formalizations and found that a wide variety of conclusions
about the approach’s eﬃcacy are possible.
Both approaches also fail to model the information ﬂow associated with ﬁscal news. Ex-
post analysis misspeciﬁes the tax policy rule, while ex-ante analysis leaves the policy rule
unspeciﬁed. In the presence of ﬁscal foresight, neither approach correctly identiﬁes the
behavior underlying tax policy choices.
Moving beyond the narrow issue of identifying the impacts of ﬁscal foresight, the ex-
ante approach is likely to be of limited utility even if it successfully identifies the impacts of
exogenous news about future tax changes. Imagine that some non-tax shock raises the market
value of government debt; for example, an open-market sale of bonds. In our formalization
of the narrative method, this would raise expected future tax rates. Because the initial
shock carries with it the expectation of higher taxes, the shock’s impacts will be diﬀerent
than if, say, lump-sum transfers adjust to stabilize debt. But the ex-ante approach, by
treating forecasted revenue changes as exogenous regressors, does not model the linkages
between non-tax shocks and subsequent changes in revenues. Even if the approach correctly
identiﬁes ﬁscal foresight, because it does not identify ﬁscal policy behavior, it does not lead to
a way to integrate ﬁscal policy into the broader research programs being pursued at central
banks and policy institutions that are estimating DSGE models.
Future research will focus on developing the econometric techniques necessary to handle
the issues implied by the analytical framework established here. In so doing, the research
will inform how to integrate ﬁscal analysis into models designed to address a broad range of
economic questions.
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Appendix A. More on the Econometrics of Fiscal Foresight
This appendix provides a more detailed discussion of the econometric issues of ﬁscal fore-
sight. While there are several quality references on this issue, a few of the derivations in the
paper have been done without full rigor. For example, deriving the VAR representation for
a non-invertible MA representation.
Suppose we have a multivariate MA(1) process where yt is a vector of length k and t is
a white noise process
yt = t +Ω1t−1 (37)
then recursive substitution implies
t = yt −Ω1t−1 = yt −Ω1(yt−1 −Ω1t−2) = · · ·
= yt −Ω1yt−1 + · · · + (−Ω1)nyt−n + (−Ω1)n+1t−n−1
= yt +
∞∑
i=1
(−Ω1)iyt−i
While this relationship holds for all t = 0,±1,±2, ..., it is only valid if Ωi1 goes to zero as i
goes to inﬁnity. Hence, {yt} and {t} span the same space if and only if limi→∞(−Ω1)i → 0.
In order for this condition to hold, the eigenvalues of Ω1 must be less than unity in modulus.
That is, det(Ω1 − λIk) = 0 for |λ| ≥ 1. Note that a completely analogous condition is given
by rewriting (37) as yt = (Ik +Ω1L)t and requiring det(Ik +Ω1z) = 0 for |z| ≤ 1. If either
of these conditions hold, the corresponding VAR representation is given by
yt = −
∞∑
i=1
(−Ω1)iyt−i + t. (38)
This representation implies that even though an economic equilibrium may contain moving
average representations, a VAR with suﬃcient lags will provide an arbitrarily good ap-
proximation to the underlying equilibrium process. However when foresight is present, this
approximation is no longer valid because the VAR representation given by (38) does not
exist. These conditions can be generalized to an economic equilibrium with generic moving
average representation, yt = M(L)t. The requirement for invertibility is the determinant
of M(z) contain no zeros inside the unit circle.
While this condition is easy to check in theory, in practice it may be easier to follow
Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, Sargent, and Watson (2007) and derive these con-
ditions using a state-space representation. The time invariant state space system is given
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by
xt+1 = Axt + Bt
yt = Cxt + Dt
where t are the true economic shocks. Using the lag operator L and solving for yt gives
yt = [C(LI − A)−1B + D]t = H(L)t, (39)
which states the relationship between the observable vector and underlying shocks of the
model. If the determinant of H(z) has no zeros inside the unit circle (or equivalently if the
eigenvalues of A− BD−1C are inside the unit circle), then the representation is invertible.
Fiscal foresight and other types of non-invertibility can be thought of as a reduction in the
state variables in the state-space system available to the econometrician. The assumption
made throughout the paper is that agents are able to see the realizations of shocks and that
future taxes are a function of current shocks. The econometrician who only observes taxes,
therefore, is conditioning on a smaller set of state variables–denote this set of variables by
xˆt. Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, Sargent, and Watson (2007) show that for every
state space representation there exists an innovations representation (one pertaining to the
econometrician’s information set) given by
xˆt+1 = Aˆxˆt + Bˆξt
yt = Cˆxt + Dˆξt
where ξt is the one-step-ahead forecast error of predicting yt conditional on its past (i.e.,
t ≡ yt − P [yt|yt−1,yt−2, ..]). Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, Sargent, and Watson
(2007) then show that the VAR innovations of the econometrician are a combination of the
true economic shocks Dt and the error associated from estimating the state C(xt − xˆt).26
Appendix B. Growth Model and Forecasts of Revenue Changes
The model is completely conventional and is a stripped down version of the model employed
by Mertens and Ravn (2008).
B.1. The Model. The section describes the data generating process for the simulated data
used in the simulation exercises in section 6. The household chooses consumption, ct, capital,
kt, hours worked, lt, and one-period government bonds, bt, to maximize expected utility, given
by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
c1−μt − 1
1− μ + χt
(1− lt)1−θ − 1
1− θ
]
,
26An additional beneﬁt to using the state space representation is that the Kalman ﬁlter will automatically
solve the correspondence between the true economic shocks and the statistical shocks.
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subject to the budget constraint
ct + kt + bt =
(
1− τKt
)
rtkt−1 +
(
1− τLt
)
wtlt + (1− δ) kt−1 + bt−1Rt−1 + Tt,
taking all prices and policies as given. Et is the mathematical expectation conditional on
the household’s information set at t. β is the discount factor (0 < β < 1), μ and θ are the
inverses of elasticities of intertemporal substitution of consumption and leisure (μ > 0 and
θ ≥ 0), τKt and τLt are proportional tax rates levied on capital and labor income, Tt is lump-
sum transfers if positive (taxes if negative), δ is the capital depreciation rate (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1),
and Rt−1 is the gross real interest rate on government bonds. χt is the preference weight on
leisure, which follows the process
χt = χe
ε
χ
t ,
and εχt ∼ iid N(0, σ2χ).
A representative ﬁrm rents capital and labor from the household to maximize proﬁt
yt − wtlt − rtkt−1,
where wt is the real wage, rt is the capital rental rate, and, in log-linearized form, technology
obeys
lnAt = ρA lnAt−1 + εAt .
Total goods produced each period are yt = Atk
α
t−1l
1−α
t .
Tax policy rules allow tax rates to respond to endogenous variables and to anticipated
(superscripted “a”) and unanticipated (superscripted “u”) random components, which are
uncorrelated. We allow for q periods of foresight. The tax rates themselves are permitted to
be correlated, reﬂecting the fact that typical tax legislation usually changes both labor and
capital tax rates. In log-linearized forms the rules are
τ̂Kt = ρτ τ̂
K
t−1 + μ
C ŷt + e
Ku
t + ξ
K
t−q, (40)
τ̂Lt = ρτ τ̂
L
t−1 + μ
C ŷt + e
Lu
t + ξ
L
t−q, (41)
ξKt = μ
T ŷt−1 + γτ ŝBt−1 + e
Ka
t , (42)
and
ξLt = μ
T ŷt−1 + γτ ŝBt−1 + e
La
t , (43)
where sBt−1 = bt−1/yt−1. We allow correlation between the two tax rates, so
eKut = ρKLε
Lu
t + ε
Ku
t (44)
eLut = ρKLε
Ku
t + ε
Lu
t (45)
eKat = ρKLε
La
t + ε
Ka
t (46)
and
eLat = ρKLε
Ka
t + ε
La
t , (47)
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where ρKL characterizes the correlation between two tax shocks, ε
Ku
t ∼ iid N(0, σ2Ku), εLut ∼
iid N(0, σ2Lu), ε
Ka
t ∼ iid N(0, σ2Ka), and εLat ∼ iid N(0, σ2La).
Tax rules (40) and (41) imply that, in addition to the AR(1) component, the tax rates
allow for an automatic stabilizer (μC ≥ 0), and the two tax rates at t depend on unexpected
exogenous shocks, εKut and ε
Lu
t , and the announced changes, ξ
K
t−q and ξ
L
t−q. Fiscal foresight,
as characterized by ξKt−q and ξ
L
t−q, is meant to capture the tax changes enacted at t− q to be
implemented at t. Actual tax policy changes are motivated by various economic and political
considerations. ξKt and ξ
L
t in (42) and (43) model two motivations explicitly: controlling debt
(γτ > 0) and counteracting output declines (μ
T > 0), plus the random disturbances (eKat
and eLat ). We allow one-quarter legislative lags to reﬂect the delay between government’s
recognition of the need to act and the actual passage of tax law changes. Actual lags are
typically longer than one quarter.
To complete the model speciﬁcation, transfers and government spending follow AR(1)
processes:
ŝGt = ρGŝ
G
t−1 + ε
G
t (48)
and
ŝTt = ρT ŝ
T
t−1 + γT ŝ
B
t−1 + ε
T
t , (49)
where sGt = gt/yt, s
T
t = Tt/yt, ε
G
t ∼ iid N(0, σ2G) and εTt ∼ iid N(0, σ2T ). Some exercises will
allow lump-sum transfers to adjust to stabilize debt (γT < 0, γτ = 0) while others will have
tax rates adjust to debt (γτ > 0, γT = 0).
The government’s budget constraint at each period is
bt = gt + Rt−1bt−1 − τLt wtlt − τKt rtkt−1 + Tt, (50)
B.2. Revenue Forecasts. The Romers and Mertens and Rvan use government produced
revenue forecasts of tax bills as proxies to capture agents’ knowledge about future tax policy
changes. In our theoretical environment, government forecasts are not available. Instead,
we compute forecasts in a way that captures the information set upon which government
revenue forecasts are based.
In practice, when a tax bill is enacted at t, revenue forecasts are produced conditional on
the available information at t. In the model, tax changes are enacted each period, which
signal tax policy to be implemented q quarters later. The size of this tax rate change is
characterized by ξKt and ξ
L
t . To generate the revenue forecast of t + q for the enacted tax
change at t, we multiply the size of the tax rate change of t+q known at t with the forecasted
tax base of t+ q, conditional on information at t.
To be speciﬁc, the solution to the DSGE model can be written as
Xt = AXt−1 + Mεt (51)
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where Xt is a vector including all endogenous and exogenous variables in the model and εt is
a vector including all the exogenous shocks in the model.27 Let εt = {εt, εt−1, . . . , ε1} denote
the history of exogenous shocks up to date t and εt+ = {εt+1, εt+2, . . . , εT+K} denote future
exogenous shocks. For each date t = 1, 2, . . . , T through the sample of length T, we compute
the forecast conditional on εt, with εt+ = 0. This yields the projection of tax rates changes
of t + q based on ξKt|t and ξ
L
t|t and the tax base y t+q|t. Let dτ
for
t+q|t represent the projection of
capital or labor tax rate changes to be implemented at t+ q conditional on information at t.
Revenues projected in period t+ q, conditional on information at t, are then dτ fort+q|t× y t+q|t .
Following the Romers and Mertens and Rvan, we normalize these revenue projections by the
actual value of output in period t + q, so the T at+q series used in the regression in equation
(36) is given by
T at+q =
dτ fort+q|t × y t+q|t
Yt+q
. (52)
When forecasting revenues of enacted tax laws, government budgeting agencies shut down
the feedback eﬀects on tax revenues through the tax base.28 Therefore, the tax base used
to compute revenue forecasts is the one forecasted under the existing law. In a general
equilibrium framework, tax policy changes can arise from endogenous reasons. It is infeasible
in our theoretical framework to forecast the tax base assuming the absence of tax changes (i.e.
setting ξKt|t = ξ
L
t|t = 0), except when μ
T = γτ = 0. Instead, we compute the forecasts of the
tax base conditional on information at t. But to be consistent with actual government revenue
forecasting procedure, we hold the tax base constant when computing revenue diﬀerences as
shown in (52).
B.3. Calibration. In the simulations, we set T = 240 quarters to mimic the length of post-
war macro time series and the simulation starts from the model’s steady state. Most of the
parameters are set to the values comparable to those in the RBC literature
β = .99, α = .36, μ = θ = 1, δ = .025, ρA = .95, s
G = .2
We set χ = 3 so that the steady state time share devoted to work is about 0.2. Based
on Braun’s (1994) estimate of the standard deviation of technology shocks in a model with
technology and ﬁscal shocks, we set σA = 0.009.
The steady state capital and labor tax rates are set to τK = .39 and τL = .21, based on the
average capital and labor tax rate series (1947:1Q-2007:2Q) constructed by Jones’s (2002)
deﬁnition. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) estimate the quarterly elasticity of tax revenues
with respect to output and obtain an average over the post-war period of 2.08, which implies
27The original form of the solution has a VARMA(1,6) representation. By including exogenous variables
in Xt and introducing a series of dummy variables, we are able to put the solution in a seeminly VAR (1)
format, as presented in (51).
28For the practice of revenue forecasts, see Joint Committee on Taxation (2005) and Auerbach (2005).
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that the elasticity of tax rates to output is approximately 1; we set μC = 1 in (40) and (41).
To calibrate ρτ , ρKL, σKa, σLa, σKu, and σLu, we estimate two reduced-form tax equations
based on federal data only:
τKt = α0 + α1τ
K
t−1 + α2yt + α3yt−1 + α4s
B
t−1 + e
K
t (53)
τLt = β0 + β1τ
L
t−1 + β2yt + β3yt−1 + β4s
B
t + e
L
t ,
where variables are in logarithms. Estimation of (53) results in σ̂eK = .036, σ̂eL = .028,
and the correlation between eKt and e
L
t is about .5. Assume the variance of anticipated
and unanticipated exogenous tax shocks are of the same size. Setting σKa = σKu = .025,
σLa = σLu = .02, and ρKL = .25 makes the standard errors of exogenous capital and labor tax
shocks and their correlation in the model roughly match the reduced-form estimation results.
In addition, α̂1 = .91 and β̂1 = .89 so we set ρτ = .9 in (40) and (41). For tax legislation
considered in Mertens and Ravn, the maximum implementation lag is six quarters. For
modeling simplicity, we assume all anticipated tax policy changes have an implementation
lag of six quarters, so q = 6.
When capital and labor tax rates are assumed to adjust to clear the government’s budget,
set γτ = .05 and γT = 0. When lump-sum transfers clear the budget, set γτ = 0 and
γT = −.1. The steady state transfer to output ratio is set to sT = .07. Along with other
ﬁscal parameters, this implies the debt to output ratio is 0.475 in the steady state, roughly
equal to the postwar historical average share of federal government debt held by the private
sector. We set μT in (42) and (43) to .5.
Finally, the model assumes an exogenous component in the process of government spend-
ing, transfers, and the preference weight on leisure, the standard errors for these three shocks
are set to .02.
B.4. Computing Impulse Response Functions. The simulation exercises compare the
impulse responses estimated from simulated data with theoretical responses to an exogenous
anticipated tax shock. Assume the economy is at the steady state before time 1. To ﬁnd the
theoretical responses to an anticipated capital tax cut, following the usual procedure, we set
εKa1 = −1,
{
εKai
}
i=2,3,...
= 0, and all other shocks to zero. The moving average representation
of the DSGE solution (51) is then used to compute the theoretical impulse responses. To
make units comparable to the empirical responses, the size of the exogenous capital tax cut
is converted to one percent of output at time 1. The theoretical responses are plotted as the
thick solid lines in ﬁgures 4-7. The impulse responses to an anticipated labor tax shock are
computed analogously.
To compute the empirical responses, we follow the procedure adopted by Mertens and
Ravn (2008). For each draw of the simulated data, we estimate the following empirical
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model29
Xt = A + CXt−1 +
24∑
i=0
DiT
u
t−i +
24∑
i=0
FiT
a
t−i +
6∑
i=1
GiT
a
t+i + ut. (54)
We begin by setting T a7 = −1, X0 = 0, and all other T ai and T ui to zero. The estimated VAR
system of (54) is then iterated to trace out the responses of the system (Xt) to an anticipated
cut in capital taxes equal to one percent of output. Speciﬁcally, the system’s responses for
30 quarters from time 1 to an anticipated capital or labor tax cut to be implemented at time
7 can be computed by
X̂1 = −Ĝ6,
X̂i = ĈX̂i−1 − Ĝ6−i+1, for i = 2, ..., 5,
X̂i = ĈX̂i−1 − F̂i−6, for i = 6, ..., 30.
After 1000 draws of sequences of simulated data, the exercise produces 1000 empirical impulse
responses. Their mean values are the thin-solid lines in ﬁgures 4-7. The error bands of the
impulse responses are 16th and 84th percentile of the responses sorted quarter by quarter,
and are represented by the dotted-dashed lines in the ﬁgures.
29The only diﬀerence from Mertens and Ravn’s model is that we include more lags of anticipated and
unanticipated tax regressors.
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